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Village League v. State, Bd. Of Equalization, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 90
(October 30, 2008) 1
Property Tax- Petition for Writ of Certiorari or Writ of Mandamus

Summary
This is an original petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus challenging the Nevada
State Board of Equalization’s review and remand of the Washoe County Board of Equalization’s
determination to equalize certain taxable valuations.
Disposition/Outcome
The Nevada Supreme Court held the State Board of Equalization (“State Board”) retained
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the Washoe County Assessor (“Assessor”) in April 2007,
even though the statutory deadline had expired, because the deadline is directory, meaning that it
is advisory rather than compulsory. However, the State Board has discretion to remand a matter
to a county board only when the record before the State Board is inadequate because of “an act
or omission of the county assessor, the district attorney or the county board of equalization.” 2
Thus, the Court held that the State Board arbitrarily remanded the matter to the County Board
because there was sufficient evidence in the record for the State Board to review. Accordingly,
the Court granted Village League’s (the “Taxpayer’s”) petition for a writ of mandamus.
Factual and Procedural History
In 2002, the Assessor physically reappraised properties in Incline Village and Crystal
Bay to determine their taxable values for the 2003-2004 tax year. The reappraisals dramatically
increased tax assessments for many taxpayers, and they began to question the methods used by
the Assessor in developing the tax values. For the 2006-2007 year, the year at issue in this case,
the number of taxpayer challenges increased exponentially due, in part, to a district court
decision originating from taxpayer challenges to the 2003-2004 assessments. 3
In Bakst, 17 taxpayers challenged the methods used by the Assessor to appraise property
for the 2003-2004 year. 4 The County and State Boards upheld the valuations of the taxpayers’
properties; however, in January 2006, the district court issued a decision declaring the Assessor’s
methods for creating the taxable values were unconstitutional, and therefore, void.5 The district
court ordered the taxable values of the 17 properties be rolled back to the values of 2002-2003,
which the taxpayers conceded were constitutional. The Assessor and County appealed the
decision.
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While the Bakst, appeal was pending; hundreds of taxpayers in the Incline Village and
Crystal Bay areas challenged their property tax assessments for the 2006-2007 year, seeking
rollbacks similar to the taxpayers in Bakst. The County Board found that in approximately 300
cases in 2006-2007, the Assessor had used the methodologies that the district court in Bakst had
deemed unconstitutional. The County Board therefore ordered the 300 properties’ taxable values
be rolled back to the values for 2002-2003.
After the County Board decided those challenges, it had created an unequal rate of
taxation for the 2006-2007 year. Accordingly, the County Board made a general equalization
decision, which is at issue in this petition. Under its regulatory duty to “seek to equalize taxable
valuation within…the whole county,” 6 the County Board rolled back the taxable values for the
approximately 8,700 other properties in the Incline Village and Crystal Bay areas.
The Assessor appealed the equalization decision to the State Board. The State Board
began its annual session for the 2006-2007 tax year on March 27,2006. The State Board must
decide all cases that will have a “substantial effect on tax revenues” on or before April 15 of each
year, 7 held a hearing to determine if any of the cases before it would have a substantial effect on
tax revenues. While the 300 individual cases and the generalization decision for the 8,700 cases
would substantially effect revenue, the State Board did not hold its first hearing on the merits of
the Assessor’s appeal until April 2007. The State Board was advised to wait because the Court
had yet to make its ruling on the Bakst appeal. The Court made its ruling on Bakst in December
2006, and in January 2007, the County Board issued its written equalization decision rolling back
8,700 properties’ taxable values.
At the hearing, the State Board decided that, as appellant, the Assessor was a party and
that all of the 8,700 taxpayers affected by the equalization decision were the respondents. The
State Board permitted Village League to argue on the 8,700 taxpayers’ behalf. Village League
asserted that the County Board had rolled back the 8,700 properties’ taxable values because the
Assessor had used unconstitutional methods to develop the values.
The State Board concluded that the record contained insufficient evidence to enable it to
consider the propriety of the County Board’s decision to roll back the taxable values. The State
Board remanded the case to the County Board so that it could further develop the record. The
Taxpayers, argue that the State Board has no jurisdiction to act on the Assessor’s appeal after
October 1, 2006, and no authority to remand the matter back to the County Board.
Discussion
Here, the Court sat en banc and decided that because there is no adequate legal remedy
available to the Taxpayers if the State Board’s remand was in error, it will consider a petition for
extraordinary relief. Moreover, the Court determined that the general equalization is an
appealable action, the State Board did have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the State Board
arbitrarily remanded the case to the County Board.
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I.

General Equalization is an appealable action of the County Board

Here, the Court must determine whether the Assessor could appeal the County Board’s
decision in the first instance. Any taxpayer aggrieved at the action of the county board of
equalization in equalizing, or failing to equalize, the value of his property, or property of others,
or a county assessor, may file an appeal with the State Board of Equalization. 8 Therefore, a
taxpayer or an assessor may appeal a county board’s decision regarding a property’s taxable
valuation to the State Board. 9 Here, although the County Board’s decision was one of general
equalization, it was an action of the County Board and therefore appealable to the State Board by
the Assessor.
II.

The State Board had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the statutory deadlines
for action by boards of equalization are directory

Two statutory deadlines establish dates by which the State Board is directed to complete
its business. Specifically, the State Board is to make decisions on matters substantially affecting
tax revenues by April 15 of each year, 10 and all other State Board business is to be completed by
October 1 of each year. 11
The Court’s analysis of the statutory deadlines centered on a determination of whether
the deadlines are meant to be mandatory or directory. This court has long held that when a
statutory time limit is material, it should be construed as mandatory unless the Legislature
intended otherwise. 12 Furthermore, statutes creating time or manner restrictions are generally
construed as mandatory. 13 Moreover, the Taxpayers note that over 100 years ago, this court
held, in State v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., that the then-existing statutory deadline for the
State Board was mandatory. 14 In contrast, statutes are typically considered directory, or advisory
only, when they require performance within a reasonable time or provide specifically that
substantial compliance is sufficient. 15
Here, the court assessed the intent of the Legislature by looking to the language of the
statute. The court determined that the language of NRS 361.380(1) suggests that deadlines are
mandatory. However, the court looked to another statute that indicates that the Legislature
intended NRS Chapter 361 deadlines to be permissive. 16
Additionally, the court considered the implications of construing deadlines as mandatory
or directory. The court opined that construing the deadlines as mandatory would result in
denying taxpayers the opportunity to challenge assessments, whereas construing deadlines as
directory would allow the boards to hear all of the taxpayer appeals. Furthermore, the court
determined that it may construe a statute as directory to prevent “harsh, unfair or absurd
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consequences.” 17 As a result, the court held that the Legislature intended the statutory deadlines
for the State Board to be directory, and therefore, it overruled the prior holding in Central
Pacific. Accordingly, the court opined that the State Board retained jurisdiction to hear the
Assessor’s appeal of the County Board’s decision to equalize property values in the taxpayers’
areas.

III.

The State Board arbitrarily remanded the County Board’s equalization decision

The State Board may remand a matter to a county board of equalization if the record is
inadequate because of “an act or omission of the county assessor, the district attorney or the
county board of equalization.” 18 Thus, the State Board may remand a case to develop the record
if one of the county actors caused the record to be insufficient for its review.
The County Board’s record contained detailed minutes of the meetings that the board had
in determining whether or not to rollback the taxable values to the 8,700 properties.
Furthermore, the record explicitly states that the County Board considered whether the
Assessor’s calculations were unconstitutional in light of the Bakst holding.
The court concluded that the State Board’s remand order disregarded the record and
reasoning of the County Board. Furthermore, the court opined that the State Board had pointed
to no act or omission rendering the record before it inadequate to consider the merits of the
County Board’s equalization decision. Therefore, the State Board arbitrarily exercised its
discretion when it remanded this matter to the County Board, and the court determined that writ
relief was substantively warranted.
Conclusion
The court denied the Taxpayer’s request for writ of certiorari, as the State Board did
retain jurisdiction over the Assessor’s appeal; however, the court did grant the petition for a writ
of mandamus, because the Taxpayers demonstrated that they are without adequate legal remedy
and that the State Board arbitrarily exercised its discretion. Thus, the court issued the writ
instructing the State Board to vacate its remand order and proceed with its consideration of the
Assessor’s appeal of the County Board’s equalization decision on the merits.
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